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Abstract and Keywords
The legendary Aesop, whom Herodotus (Histories, 2.134) places on Samos in the
sixth century BCE, did not write a single fable with his own hand. The fables that
have survived under his name were written in the centuries after his death,
composed by a diverse set of writers who labeled their stories “Aesop’s” with
little concern for historical accuracy. We are left with hundreds of tales and
anecdotes scattered across the remains of classical literature, in both Greek and
Latin, in prose and in verse, each one with murky origins and dubious links to
the life of Aesop....
The legendary Aesop, whom Herodotus (Histories, 2.134) places on Samos in the
sixth century BCE, did not write a single fable with his own hand. The fables that
have survived under his name were written in the centuries after his death,
composed by a diverse set of writers who labeled their stories “Aesop’s” with
little concern for historical accuracy. We are left with hundreds of tales and
anecdotes scattered across the remains of classical literature, in both Greek and
Latin, in prose and in verse, each one with murky origins and dubious links to
the life of Aesop.1 While this state of affairs poses significant challenges for the
philologist and the textual critic, the openness of the fable tradition, along with
its simple style and moralizing tone, make Aesop a useful point of reference for
investigations of early Greek thought.
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The philosophical content of Aesop’s fables is perhaps best described as
“popular” or “applied” ethics.2 Like other ancient satirical genres (e.g.,
iambography, Greek comedy, Roman satire), fables describe and condemn
common varieties of misbehavior, especially greed, hypocrisy, vanity, and
deceit.3 But two salient features set the fable apart from other forms of
moralizing literature: (1) the drawing out of an explicit message in the form of a
moral4 and (2) the use of talking animals as protagonists. The aim of this brief
reflection is to explore the relationship between these (p.58) two aspects of the
fable by looking at the role played by animals in the genre’s moralizing program.
Why do animals feature so prominently in Aesop’s fables? And why do they talk?
According to our ancient sources, the fable’s use of animals primarily serves to
underscore the fictionality and lightness of the stories.5 The risibility of the
humanized animal allows the fable to make its point without boring or insulting
an addressee. So, it follows, while calling someone an ass might reasonably
cause offense, fable tellers can be more effective and more politic by offering
advice or criticism with a made-up story. Take, for example, this excerpt from
“The Ass in the Lion’s Skin” (Perry, 188):6
An ass put on a lion’s skin and went around frightening the other animals
(ta aloga zoa). He saw a fox and tried to terrify her, too. But she happened
to have heard his voice and said to him, “I can assure you I would have
been afraid of you, too, if I hadn’t heard your braying.” So it is that some
ignorant men who create an impression of being someone by their outward
elegance expose themselves by their own talkativeness (glōssalgias).7
By bringing to the fore the fictitious nature of the story, animal fables entertain
and establish that the only possibility of serious meaning is the interpretation;
the auditor must listen to the moral and decide if the fable applies.8
No ancient writers (and few modern critics) seem to think of Aesop’s talking
animals as having anything at all to do with real animals. But it is worthwhile to
reflect on why fable, one of the world’s earliest forms of ethical literature,
turned to anthropomorphized animals for its chief protagonists.9 That is, we can
think of the fable animal as a particularly early and dynamic instantiation of an
ancient preoccupation with tracking the boundaries between human and animal.
The polysemy of the well-known Greek conception of logos is essential here; it
can (p.59) denote (among other things) “speech,” “conversation,” “reason,”
and (significantly) “story” or “fable.”10 While the animal world was believed to
be governed by appetite and self-interest, humans have the capacity to use
reason (logos) and thus to settle conflicts with conversation (also logos) and
mutual persuasion.11 Aesopic fables (called Aisopeioi logoi) play with the
multiple meanings of logos by having animals use human speech to appeal to the
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laws and customs that govern human society. More often than not, however, the
animals’ attempts at persuasion fail and give way to natural instincts.
As a typical example, in the fable of the “Wolf and Lamb” from the Collectio
Augustana,12 the wolf’s search for a just (eulogos) cause to devour the lamb is
met with the lamb’s readiness to defend itself with words (Perry, 155):
A wolf saw a lamb drinking from a river and decided to find a just cause for
making a meal of him. So from where he stood upstream he began to
complain that the lamb was muddying the water and not letting him get a
drink. When the lamb said that he was no more than touching the water
with his lips and that besides, from where he was standing downstream, he
couldn’t possibly disturb the water above him, the wolf, failing in this
complaint, said, “But last year you made unpleasant remarks about my
father.” Then, when the lamb said he wasn’t even a year old, the wolf said
to him, “Am I to be cheated out of eating you just because you are so glib
(apologiōn) with your excuses?”
The fable (logos) shows that those who are set on doing wrong are not to
be deterred even by a legal argument (dikaia apologia).
According to the moral, the fable is about the futility of using words to persuade
those who refuse to listen to legal (or just) arguments. Greek ideas about what
separates the human from the animal map directly onto the narrative: Aesop’s
animals may (p.60) paradoxically have the power of speech (logos), but the
fable’s (human) addressee must use reason (logos) to recognize and learn from
the wolf’s refusal to listen.
Even when the issue does not arise so explicitly, the gap between talking animals
and listening humans appears to be built into the very structure of Aesopic fable.
Fable animals are usually motivated only by predatory or survival instincts; they
constantly resort to violence despite their ability to converse with one another.
The attached morals then deliver their messages by marking the transition from
animal fiction to human lesson, as in the following examples:
So it is with men, too. Those who give up what they have in hope of greater
things are ill-advised.
(“Hawk and Nightingale,” Perry, 4)
So it is with men, too. It behooves men of sense not to undertake anything
until they have seen where it leads.
(“Fox and Goat in the Well,” Perry, 9)
So it is with men, too. Liars always show off most when there is no one to
discredit them.
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(“The Fox, the Monkey, and His Ancestors,” Perry, 14)
It is just the same with men: some of them pretend to be suffering while
others are doing the work. (“The Oxen and Squeaky Axle,” Perry, 45)
A number of different formulaic phrases introduce morals in our surviving
collections (e.g., the common Latin phrase fabula docet, “The fable teaches”),
but these above, attached to fables in the Collectio Augustana, begin with
phrases (e.g., houtōs kai tōn anthrōpōn) that spell out how we humans are meant
to learn from the fictionalized animals: sometimes we behave like animals, but
we must use our more robust possession of logos to improve ourselves.
By toying with the conventional role played by logos in separating human from
animal, fable implies that there are some humans who, (p.61) left to their own
devices, would prefer to live like animals. This idea surfaces most explicitly in a
pair of fables on the origin of humans:
“Zeus, the Animals, and Man”
(Perry, 311)
They say that creatures were first fashioned and that gifts were bestowed
on them by god: strength to one, speed to another, wings to another; but
man stood there naked and said, “I am the only one you have left without a
gift.” Zeus said, “You are ungrateful although you have been granted the
greatest gift of all, for you have received reason (logos), which prevails
among gods as it does among men, is more powerful than the powerful,
and swifter than the swiftest.” Then, recognizing his gift, man went his way
in reverence and gratitude. That although all rational (logō) beings are
honored by god, some men are unappreciative of this honor but are rather
jealous of dumb and irrational (aloga) beasts.
“Prometheus and Men”
(Perry, 240)
At the direction of Zeus, Prometheus fashioned men and beasts. But when
Zeus saw that there were more of the irrational (aloga) animals, he
ordered him to destroy some of the beasts and make them over into men.
When he did as he was told, it turned out that the ones who had not been
fashioned as men from the start had human form but were bestial in spirit
(tas de psuchas thēriōdeis). The fable has a lesson for men who are bestial
(thēriōdē) and ill-tempered.
These fables on human origins shed light on some basic assumptions that seem
to underwrite the use of talking animals throughout the tradition: animals are
“irrational” (aloga) and “dumb”; humans, though “naked” when compared to the
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physical gifts of the other creatures, have been given “reason” (logos) to
compensate for their relative weakness; despite the gift of reason, certain
humans nonetheless have “beastly souls” and are prone to imitating animal
behavior.
(p.62) It is also tempting to read these tales as accounts of the origins of fable,
which, after all, makes animals’ limited participation in logos into a tool for
teaching right and wrong behavior. In granting animals a share of logos, Aesopic
fable necessarily blurs the lines between human and animal and, however
playfully, hints at a continuum of human-animal behavior. On some level every
animal fable challenges us to confront our conceptions of what exactly separates
humans from animals. As a logos meant to be spoken and heard, each fable
insists that it is our responsibility to listen and learn from its funhouse version of
animal behavior. But amusing or not, fable animals are inevitably implicated in
broader commitments to the human-animal binary; our understanding of those
commitments can be enriched if we listen carefully to Aesop’s talking animals.
Notes:

(1.) For an overview of our sources for Aesop’s fables in Greek and Latin, see
Holzberg, The Ancient Fable; cf. Lefkowitz, “Aesop and Animal Fables.”
(2.) Zafiropoulos, Ethics in Aesop’s Fables, 26–36, provides an excellent survey
of scholarship on the Greek fable’s ethical content and function.
(3.) On the relationship between fable and satire, see Cozzoli, “Poesia satirica
latina”; del Vecchio and Fiore, “Fabula in satura”; Cavarzere, “Ego Polivi
Versibus Senariis”; cf. Holzberg, The Ancient Fable, 31–35.
(4.) Ancient writers use several different terms for the pithy messages attached
to fables (e.g., epimuthion, promuthion, epilogos, paramuthion, perimuthion),
though none of them carries the ethical connotations of “moral” in English. See
Perry, “The Origin of the Epimythium”; Nøjgaard, La fable antique, 1:122–28.
(5.) On animal fables as a useful way to lighten the mood and provoke laughter,
see, e.g., Aristophanes, Wasps, 566, 1256–61 (see Henderson trans.); Cicero, De
Inventione, 1.17.25 (see Hubbell trans.); Quintilian, Inst. 1.9.1–3; 6.3.44 (in
Russell, Quintillian: The Orator’s Education); Plutarch, Moralia, 14e and 162bc
(see Helmbold trans.).
(6.) Numbers refer to fables collected in Perry, Aesopica.
(7.) All translations are from Daly, Aesop without Morals.
(8.) Cf. Nøjgaard, La fable antique, 1:63. The treatment and distribution of
speech (logos) is not straightforward here; the ass, for example, does not speak
but is twice characterized as making animal sounds (phthegxamenou,
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ogkōmenou). Moreover the other animals that his lion costume is meant to
frighten are characterized as “speechless” (aloga).
(9.) The animal fable did not, of course, originate in Greece, nor did the Greeks
think it did; Greek authors associated it with various exotic figures (e.g., Conis
the Cilician, Thouros the Sybarite, and Cybissus the Libyan) and with locales
that had reputations as sources of venerable wisdom (e.g., Libya, Phrygia,
Cilicia, Caria, Egypt); cf. Lefkowitz, “Aesop and Animal Fables.”
(10.) A number of different terms could describe fable, including logos, ainos,
and muthos in Greek, and apologus, fabula, and fabella in Latin; cf. van Dijk,
ΑΙΝΟΙ, 79–111.
(11.) See the useful comments in Dover, Greek Popular Morality, 74–75.
(12.) The Collectio Augustana, usually placed in the first or second century CE,
is our earliest surviving Greek fable collection; the Augustana fables can be
found in Perry, Aesopica, numbered 1–231.
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